"You get an ology, you're a scientist," said Maureen Lipman in the BT ads. But what if you invent one? Deliverology is a phrase conjured up by a civil servant to describe the methods of the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit (PMDU), set up by Tony Blair in 2001 and led by Sir Michael Barber, who describes its work and principles in two books, Instruction to Deliver (2007) and Deliverology (2010, chiefly for the US market.)
The PMDU was the key element in Blair's idea of "joined up government". It was a small group, operating with Blair's full personal authority, designed to provide "gentle but unrelenting" pressure on departments to do as Blair wished - ie improve what he saw as delivery of services. Its remit included policing, transport - "I only want you to sort out the railways" - health and education, and Sir Michael's books make it clear that he sees the approach as a success. I think this is only partially true.
Let's begin with the successes, the first of which is unequivocal. Sir Michael was part of a small group set up by Gillian Shephard as secretary of state to find a solution to the disaster of Hackney Downs School. The outcome of closing the school and starting again led to Mossbourne Community Academy, a breakthrough in state education in inner cities, and a major achievement on the part of all involved in it, including Sir Michael and Tony Blair.
The work on policing led to a reduction in recorded crime figures that persists, but that may or may not reflect a real reduction in crime, as no-one who does not have a vested interest believes them. The legal aid bill may be a better indication of crime rates. The state of the railways is a matter of debate - public subsidy has been massive and the fare structure for long journeys is ludicrous, with some tickets virtually given away, and others adding the cost to a hotel room to what might be seen as a normal fare. Can Sir Michael really claim to have "sorted out the railways"?
Has health improved? We have new hospitals, but not enough nurses, and those we have do not do enough nursing. On the other hand, the NHS is beset by health tourism and population changes that make it very difficult for it to function as we wish it to, and it would not be fair to blame this on deliverology, unless this were seen as the solution to all problems. I recently heard a spokesman for the Royal College of Surgeons lament at that organisation's exclusion from the monitoring of hospitals, which he felt would have dealt with the situation in Staffordshire more effectively. Management without detailed knowledge of the field is to an important degree operating in the dark.
So to education, which is the field Sir Michael knows most about, and particularly to the National Literacy Strategy, for which he feels personally responsible. Sir Michael notes a rapid improvement in literacy up to around 2000, followed by a stall and failure to meet targets, which he sees as a key background factor in the fall of Estelle Morris. Sir Michael sees the failure to meet the target as stemming from his taking his foot off the pedal, and herein lies the error. Literacy standards improved from 1997 because schools were paying specific attention to English teaching rather than, as its director, John Stannard, put it, "piggybacking" it onto other subjects. They stopped improving because of basic weaknesses in the methodology of the strategy that neither Sir Michael nor David Blunkett were in a position to identify. These included over-rigid and excessive lesson plans (I described the approach in The Guardian as "Cromwellian"), the "searchlights" approach to reading, and formulaic importation of grammatical terminology from the adult discpline of linguistics, irrespective of whether it was the best way to teach it. Similar errors beset every element of the strategy's work, including its over-scripted plans for children with learning difficulties, which prevented teachers from properly considering the child in front of them.
So, the strategy ensured consistency, which is better than chaos. It did not lay the foundations for further progress, any more than its companion in maths did. There is a similar weakness in the managerial approach of McKinsey and Company, to which Sir Michael moved after the 2005 election, and which relies overwhelmingly on data and movement of data as evidence of success. In an activity such as railways, it is not too difficult to gather reliable data. Train services can be measured. The rise of accountancy to its current dominant position in management consultancy is based on using information that accountants had and that other people did not. In business, it works, or the accountants would not be coining it as they do.
In education, though, data are based on analysis of performance. This analysis provides a buffer zone between the facts and the data, and this buffer zone allows manipulation. So, to take an example from Deliverology, you can increase the number of graduates by increasing university admissions (either by lowering grade requirements or by giving out more high grades) and lowering the requirements for graduation. The figures will then show that you are making improvements. An examiner wrote to The Guardian recently that the government had instructed his chief to reduce all grade boundaries by five per cent. This would improve the pass rate, and similar manipulation took place in the late 90s, when the QCA ordered the Cambridge board to reduce its boundaries after it had completed its trials. These shenanigans make test scores as reliable as the figures in Stalin's five-year plans. Onwards and upwards.
So, did the PMDU deliver nothing? No. It delivered more consistent management and a focus on figures. Its emphasis on unreliable data may, though, have been responsible for the calamity that hit the school inspection service in 2005. Sir Michael does not mention this in his book, and it would be interesting to find out. I'll try a FoI request.